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Abstract 11 
It is widely acknowledged that introducing a price on carbon 12 
represents a crucial precondition for filling the current gap in low-13 
carbon investment. However, as this paper argues, carbon pricing in 14 
itself may not be sufficient. This is due to the existence of market 15 
failures in the process of creation and allocation of credit that may 16 
lead commercial banks – the most important source of external 17 
finance for firms – not to respond as expected to price signals. 18 
Under certain economic conditions, banks would shy away from 19 
lending to low-carbon activities even in presence of a carbon price. 20 
This possibility calls for the implementation of additional policies not 21 
based on prices. In particular, the paper discusses the potential role 22 
of monetary policies and macroprudential financial regulation: 23 
2 
 
modifying the incentives and constraints that banks face when 24 
deciding their lending strategy - through, for instance, a 25 
differentiation of reserve requirements according to the destination 26 
of lending - may fruitfully expand credit creation directed towards 27 
low-carbon sectors. This seems to be especially feasible in emerging 28 
economies, where the central banking framework usually allows for 29 
a stronger public control on credit allocation and a wider range of 30 
monetary policy instruments than the sole interest rate. 31 
Keywords: green investment, low-carbon finance, banking, credit 32 
creation, green macroprudential regulation, monetary policy 33 
JEL classification: E50, G20, Q56 34 
 35 
 1 
1. Introduction  1 
Transitioning to a low-carbon society will require a large amount of economic resources to be 2 
invested in ‘green’ sectors1 (Ceres, 2014; IEA, 2012; McCollum et al., 2014; WEF, 2013). Investment 3 
is, from a macroeconomic perspective, expenditure: investing consists in purchasing investment 4 
goods and services - e.g. wind turbines – to be used in the production of some consumption good or 5 
service – electric energy.  6 
Like any other type of expenditure, investment requires firms to have at their disposal a sufficient 7 
amount of financial means. Given the upfront costs of investments – particularly high in the case of 8 
renewable energy production - firms are typically unable to finance them through their own savings 9 
and thus necessitate access to external finance2. In other words, they need to borrow money from 10 
someone else before being able to invest. 11 
External finance can originate, to a first approximation, from three main sources: 12 
 Bank lending. Firms ask a banking institution for a loan; if the loan application is accepted, the 13 
agreed amount of credit is put at their disposal on a deposit account, which firms can then use 14 
to purchase the goods and services they need. 15 
 Market debt. Larger firms or projects can raise finance on private capital markets by issuing debt 16 
instruments. The market for ‘green bonds’3, for instance, is experiencing a phase of strong 17 
expansion. 18 
 Market equity. Private investors can also be interested in obtaining part of the project/firm 19 
ownership. In the case of companies, this can happen via the purchase of shares of publicly 20 
listed companies, or through private equity investment. 21 
Among these, bank lending is particularly important, for two main reasons. First, bank loans 22 
represent the most common source of external finance for firms. Gross bank lending to British 23 
businesses in 2013, for instance, was almost three times the gross issuance of corporate bonds and 24 
more than ten times that of public equities (Bank of England, 2014). Bank of England (2013b) also 25 
shows how the dynamics of total net external finance has been strongly driven by changes in bank 26 
lending, both before and after the financial crisis. This is true also for the Euro Zone and the United 27 
States (ECB, 2012). The relevance of bank lending as a source of external finance is especially strong 28 
for small and medium enterprises and in emerging markets (Eickmeier et al., 2013). 29 
Second, in modern societies banks are very special entities, capable of having a critical impact on the 30 
functioning of economic systems. There is in fact a crucial but often overlooked difference between 31 
banks and non-bank private investors: while the latter operate by reallocating the existing stock of 32 
credit, commercial banks are the only economic agents – together with central banks - capable of 33 
creating new credit4 (Disyatat, 2011; McLeay et al., 2014; Ryan-Collins et al., 2011). Despite its wide 34 
repercussions on the rest of the system, the ability of banks to expand the money supply is only 35 
                                                          
1
 ‘Green’ investment indicates here investment in all productive sectors that help to improve the 
environmental sustainability of the economic system: production of energy from renewable sources, 
improvement of energy efficiency in buildings and transportation, management of natural capital, waste 
management, water management, sustainable agriculture, and others. 
2
 For instance, BDRC Continental (2014) estimates that in Q4 of 2013 the proportion of British firms using 
external finance was: 74% for firms with 50-249 employees; 65% (10-49 employees); 53% (1-9 employees); 
35% (0 employees). 
3
 Green bonds are fixed-income instruments aimed at financing low-carbon or other environmentally 
sustainable activities (CBI, 2013; HSBC, 2014). 
4
 The terms ‘credit’, ‘broad money’, and ‘money supply’ are here interchangeably employed as synonyms, and 
indicate the widest monetary aggregate in the economy, the majority of which is made of bank deposits of 
various kinds. ‘Credit’ does not include, as sometimes happens in the literature, the much wider amount of 
financial assets existing in the economy. 
 2 
loosely regulated and substantially autonomous, as confirmed by the ineffectiveness of recent 36 
central banks attempts – both the traditional ones based on interest rates and the ‘unconventional’ 37 
ones centred around the expansion of central bank reserves – to reactivate bank credit creation 38 
(BIS/NIESR, 2013). 39 
Among the policies put forward to try to expand the amount of bank credit flowing to low-carbon 40 
sectors, the introduction of a carbon price - either through a tax on the polluting content of goods 41 
and services or through the creation of a market of emission permits - is the one that has gathered 42 
the vaster consensus among scholars and policy-makers. Making green products relatively more 43 
convenient through prices would boost their demand, increase the profitability of firms operating in 44 
low-carbon sectors and thus facilitate the creation of credit directed to them. 45 
However, despite being a necessary precondition to steer the economic system towards a rapid low-46 
carbon transition, the introduction of a carbon price may not be sufficient. The autonomy of the 47 
private banking sector in creating and allocating credit is in fact at the origin of a major market 48 
failure, as, even in the presence of profitable investment opportunities and the ‘right’ prices, banks 49 
may not be willing to provide the amount of credit the economy requires to move closer to full 50 
capacity utilization. Under certain economic conditions, of which the current historical period is a 51 
clear example, banks are more interested in adjusting their balance sheets by constraining credit and 52 
securing safe assets rather than pursuing the highest rates of return on investments (Koo, 2014; 53 
Zenghelis, 2012). In such circumstances, the introduction of a price on carbon may not be enough to 54 
stimulate low-carbon investment.  55 
This eventuality, jointly with the uncertainties and political difficulties surrounding the introduction 56 
of a carbon price, calls for considering additional policies targeted directly at the credit system. In 57 
particular, this paper will discuss the relevance and feasibility of using macroprudential financial 58 
regulation5 to expand the amount of credit flowing to low-carbon activities. For instance, 59 
differentiating the reserve requirements that banks have to respect according to the ‘greenness’ of 60 
the activities they finance may represent a solid incentive for them to shift part of their lending 61 
towards low-carbon sectors (Banque du Liban, 2010; Rozenberg et al., 2013).  62 
As it will be argued in section 7, this ‘green’ macroprudential regulation is likely to work only at 63 
certain conditions. In particular, it has a better chance to be effective in emerging economies, where 64 
central banks usually exhibit a higher degree of control on the dynamics of credit, thanks to the 65 
employment of a wide range of ‘quantitative’ monetary policy tools. In high-income economies, on 66 
the contrary, the reduction of monetary instruments to the sole interest rate makes it very hard for 67 
central banks to modify private banks’ lending behaviour. Nonetheless, even in these countries, the 68 
employment of quantitative monetary policies aimed at strengthening the public control on the 69 
allocation of credit - often with some specific sectors in mind - is far from unprecedented (Elliott et 70 
al., 2013). 71 
This paper thus aims to bring the green growth and sustainable development discussion closer to the 72 
one on monetary macroeconomic dynamics. A proper understanding of the interactions between 73 
these two bodies of knowledge – traditionally separate from one another - appears to be critical for 74 
the achievement of a sustainable economy. 75 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents estimates of the green investment gap 76 
and discusses the main obstacles to filling it. Section 3 explains the process of credit creation and 77 
allocation by commercial banks. Section 4 introduces the concept of credit market failure and argues 78 
for the implementation of environmental policies not based on carbon pricing. Section 5 examines 79 
                                                          
5
 The term ‘macroprudential regulation’ denotes the set of financial regulatory instruments put in place to 
improve the stability and resilience of the financial system. 
 3 
the recent regulators’ attempts to limit banks’ autonomy through financial regulation and their 80 
effects on green investment. Section 6 reviews macroprudential policy proposals aimed at increasing 81 
credit flows to low-carbon investment. Section 7 focuses on the idea of green differentiated reserve 82 
requirement ratios, discussing the conditions under which the policy is likely to be effective. Section 83 
8 analyses the potential role of development banking. Finally, section 9 concludes and discusses the 84 
role of economic theory. 85 
2. Filling the green investment gap 86 
The transition to a sustainable economic system will require economic resources to flow to low-87 
carbon productive sectors. Although the transition to a green economy is inherently systemic and 88 
would have to involve the entire economy, three key sectors exist: 1. production of energy from 89 
clean and renewable sources (for instance, solar panels and wind turbines); 2. improvement of 90 
energy efficiency (in buildings and transport especially); 3. conservation and smart use of natural 91 
capital (sustainable agriculture, fishing, water, waste and other sectors). The expansion of low-92 
carbon investment will have to take place simultaneously to a rapid decline of investment in 93 
polluting and energy-intensive sectors6. 94 
Investment in green sectors has been growing at a fast pace in recent years. In particular, 95 
investment in new renewable energy production capacity – for which more and better data is 96 
available – has reached approximately US$244 billion in 2012, an amount five times larger than in 97 
20047 (FS-UNEP and BNEF, 2013). The expansion has been particularly robust in developing regions, 98 
with China currently the main investor in renewable energy at around US$67 billion. The scale of 99 
investment is confirmed by CPI (2013), which, with a tracking method based on a wider class of 100 
investment rather than just energy supply, estimates global ‘climate finance’ in 2012 to be around 101 
US$359 billion. However, investment in clean energy is currently declining. 2012 and 2013 recorded 102 
an annual drop of 10% and 11% respectively, mainly as a result of the reduction of investment in 103 
Europe and US (BNEF, 2014). This has been due to a variety of factors, among which the cutback of 104 
feed-in tariffs and other similar policies have played a particularly important role, highlighting how 105 
these forms of energy production are still very dependent on public support. 106 
Despite the upward trend of the last decade, a large gap still exists between the current amount of 107 
green investment and what would be required to decarbonise the economy and respect the 2°C 108 
threshold in temperature increase, agreed as an objective at the 2009 Copenhagen Conference 109 
(UNFCCC, 2009). Figure 1 shows some recent estimates of this ‘green investment gap’, calculated as 110 
the amount of additional investment8 in low-carbon activities to be carried out each year over the 111 
next few decades to decarbonise the economic system. Values range from $650 to $900 billion. This 112 
scale is confirmed by McCollum et al. (2014), which use a number of Integrated Assessment Models 113 
to find that climate policies consistent with the 2°C target would entail additional investment in both 114 
energy supply and demand of about $800 billion. UNEP (2011) calculates that the yearly additional 115 
investment required to deliver a green economy – a wider objective than decarbonising the 116 
economic system - would be on average around 2% of the global GDP over the 2010-50 period ($1 to 117 
$2.6 trillion). 118 
                                                          
6
 According to FS-UNEP and BNEF (2013) gross investment in power capacity based on fossil fuels in 2012 was 
equal to US$262 billion. 
7
 Data reported in FS-UNEP and BNEF (2013) cover investments in: solar, wind, biomass & waste, small hydro, 
biofuels, geothermal and marine. Large hydro (>50 MW) is excluded. 
8
 The amount of investment reported is ‘additional’ to the underlying business-as-usual scenario considered, 
which broadly represents a prosecution of current trends. Given the large degree of uncertainty and 
methodological assumptions to be made in their computation, additional investment figures should be 
considered as indicative, and representative of just a portion of the wider social and institutional reform 
required to support a low-carbon transition.  
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[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE – File name: “Fig 1 – Green investment gap”]] 119 
[CAPTION: The green investment gap: required additional annual investment in low-carbon sectors9] 120 
The green investment gap thus appears to be very wide10, and no certainty exists regarding the 121 
means in which to fill it. Two main factors are currently preventing economic resources to flow in 122 
larger amounts to low-carbon sectors. 123 
The first factor is the depressed macroeconomic environment. Since the 2007 financial crisis, the 124 
global economic system – and high-income countries in particular – has been suffering a period of 125 
sluggish economic activity that has led to recession and high unemployment11. Low investment 126 
levels in advanced economies are a direct consequence of the endemic lack of confidence that is 127 
afflicting economic agents. Both households and non-financial firms are currently experiencing a 128 
robust process of deleveraging: rather than spending, agents prefer to postpone investment and 129 
save their income in order to repay the previously accumulated debt, or to protect themselves from 130 
possible future downturns12 (Koo, 2014; Zenghelis, 2012). 131 
The second factor limiting green investments is their unattractive risk/return profile. In particular, 132 
the risks – either real or perceived – associated with them have always been large13. The relative 133 
immaturity of the industry increases the perception of risks related to technology evolution and 134 
market development. Most importantly, green investments are perceived as being still strongly 135 
dependent on public support, which unfortunately has not been as transparent and predictable as it 136 
would have to be. Many governments are currently backing off from providing support to the sector 137 
because of the stress posed by the economic crisis. In some cases, this has gone so far as to 138 
introduce retroactive adjustments – as in the recent Spanish case - producing strong credibility 139 
issues for years to come (FS-UNEP and BNEF, 2013). 140 
In light of these risks, returns on green investments should be very high in order to attract investors. 141 
However, there is no empirical evidence this is the case (EDHEC-Risk Institute, 2010). Ceres (2014) 142 
points out how green investment performance depends on the specific type of asset class 143 
considered. The returns of direct infrastructure investment, for instance, seem to be roughly 144 
meeting investors’ targets. Fixed-income instruments linked to low-carbon investment (‘green 145 
bonds’) in general offer coupons in line with similar non-green instruments. However, public equities 146 
have significantly underperformed during the last few years compared to the rest of the market, and 147 
private equity investments have often failed to fulfil investors’ expectations. In general, therefore, 148 
financial returns on green investment do not seem to be currently able to compensate for the 149 
higher-than-average perceived risks. 150 
Additional features of low-carbon investments contribute to make them unattractive to investors. 151 
For instance, they are usually carried out over a long-term time horizon, which is unappealing to 152 
                                                          
9
 Data sources: IEA (2012), McKinsey (2010), WEF (2013). Data from McKinsey (2010) have been transformed 
from Euros to US$ using an exchange rate equal to 1.4 US$ per Euro. 
10
 However, such a surge in investment is far from unprecedented, as argued by Bowen et al. (2014). 
11
 Aggregate investment has plummeted in the United States, the European Union, Japan and other advanced 
economies as an immediate consequence of the crisis, passing from an average of 21.7% of GDP in 2007 to 
17.8% in 2009 (IMF 2013). It has slightly recovered since then, but is still far from the pre-crisis level. On the 
contrary, the average investment share in emerging markets has passed from 29.4% in 2007 to 31.5% in 2012. 
China’s investment share now reaches nearly 47% of its GDP, against the 16.2% displayed by the United States. 
12
 The situation in which all economic agents simultaneously attempt to save is usually referred to as the 
"paradox of thrift" (Keynes 1936): what is wise in a microeconomic perspective - a household or a firm trying 
to reduce its over-indebtedness by reducing spending and increasing savings - can have dreadful consequences 
from a macroeconomic point of view. The lack of private demand in a moment of crisis further worsens the 
situation by forcing firms out of the market and workers into unemployment. 
13
 See Frisari et al. (2013) for a mapping of risks affecting clean energy investments. 
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investors interested in short-term investment. Some of them – especially direct infrastructure 153 
investments – are very illiquid, and it proves very difficult for investors to sell their share before the 154 
project’s conclusion. They also typically involve very high initial capital costs. Nelson and Shrimali 155 
(2014) estimate that upfront capital costs represent 84-93% of total project costs for wind, solar, and 156 
hydro energy (compared to 66-69% for coal and 24-37% for gas). Consequently, many low-carbon 157 
investments tend to be subject to relatively high financing costs. 158 
3. Access to finance and credit creation 159 
The two conditions discussed in the previous section – the depressed macroeconomic environment 160 
and the unattractive risk/return profile of low-carbon activities – represent major obstacles to the 161 
achievement of the single most important precondition to carry out investment: the availability of 162 
financial resources. Investment is, from a macroeconomic perspective, expenditure14, and, in order 163 
to be able to spend, economic agents require financial resources (i.e. ‘money’, or ‘credit’). Without 164 
credit, firms may not be capable of investing, even if they are willing to. 165 
In modern economic systems, credit can flow to productive activities in two ways. First, credit can be 166 
transferred from the agents that happen to hold it (financers) to those interested in using it 167 
(entrepreneurs). In the case of low-carbon investment, there is currently a large discussion regarding 168 
the potential role of institutional investors15 in providing green finance (Della Croce et al., 2011). The 169 
amount of financial assets currently managed by institutional investors in the OECD countries, which 170 
Nelson and Pierpont (2013) estimate at around $76 trillion, could easily provide the required finance 171 
for the transition to a green economy. Some institutional investors are currently investing in green 172 
activities for ‘ethical’ reasons (GIIN, 2013). However, CPI (2013) estimates that institutional investors 173 
are currently providing as little as 0.11% of total climate finance. In order for the low-carbon sectors 174 
to obtain a critical mass of finance, it is crucial to attract the majority of investors who are not 175 
moved by ethical reasons, but just by the desire for economic return. 176 
The second way to make credit flow to low-carbon sectors is to create it ex nihilo. In modern 177 
economic systems credit creation is a prerogative of the private banking system (McLeay et al., 178 
2014; Ryan-Collins et al., 2011). To illustrate this concept, Figure 2 shows a simplified representation 179 
of the typical bank balance sheet. There are two main items on the asset side. The first is the stock 180 
of central bank reserves. Reserves are deposits that private banks hold at the central bank – in a 181 
similar way to households and firms holding deposits at private banks - and they are employed to 182 
settle interbank transactions. The second item on the asset side is the stock of loans granted. Loans 183 
represent a debt that clients have towards the bank, thus appearing on the asset side of the bank’s 184 
balance sheet and on the liability side of clients’ balance sheets. The main variable on the liability 185 
side is represented by the stock of clients’ deposits – that is, claims that clients have towards the 186 
bank. Finally, banks’ capital – also called ‘equity’ or ‘net worth’ - is defined as the difference between 187 
assets and liabilities, and represents the value of assets that would remain if all liabilities were 188 
extinguished. Assuming that the bank is solvent, its net worth appears on the liability side, so that 189 
the two sides of the balance sheet match each other. 190 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE – File name: “Fig 2 – Bank balance sheet] 191 
[CAPTION: The process of credit creation by private banks] 192 
Credit creation takes place with the act of lending. When banks decide to grant a loan to a client 193 
they do so by expanding both sides of their balance sheet: on the asset side a new loan is created, 194 
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 Private investment, in other words, is part of GDP when computed using the ‘expenditure approach’, 
together with private consumption, public consumption and net exports. 
15
 Institutional investors are pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds and other non-bank 
organizations managing large amounts of money on behalf of their clients. 
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while on the liability side a new deposit is put at the disposal of the customer. In other words, banks 195 
do not have to wait for a deposit to come in in order to lend the money but they create the new 196 
deposit themselves, just by typing it into the account of the customer who received the loan 197 
(McLeay et al., 2014). The balance sheet of the customer is expanded in a similar way: a new deposit 198 
is created on the asset side, while a new debt towards the bank appears on the liability side. This 199 
operation broadens the stock of money supply – or ‘broad money’ - existing in the economy, as the 200 
deposit that the bank has put at the disposal of its clients is then employed to purchase whatever 201 
goods and services are desired, thus introducing the money in circulation into the wider economy. 202 
Banks’ ability to expand the existing money supply has critical consequences on the functioning of 203 
economic systems and the availability of bank credit often represents the single most important 204 
precondition for achieving growth (Bernardo and Campiglio, 2014; Schularick and Taylor, 2012). 205 
This discussion is relevant for green investment because not enough credit, whether reallocated by 206 
non-bank investors or newly created by banks, seems to be flowing to low-carbon sectors. Investors 207 
and private banks respond to incentives very similar to those that drive the behaviour of firms. The 208 
relatively higher degree of risk associated with low-carbon sectors represents a major disincentive to 209 
channel resources to them. Additionally, global markets are currently characterised by the 210 
widespread desire for liquid, short-term assets, which is at odds with the illiquid, long-term features 211 
of typical green investments (Spencer and Stevenson, 2013). 212 
4. Carbon pricing and beyond: the relevance of credit market failures 213 
The first and foremost policy usually indicated as the solution to the low-carbon investment 214 
challenge is the introduction of a price on carbon16 (Nordhaus, 2013; Weitzman, 2014). Two main 215 
ways exist to implement a carbon price. The first is to fix the price by introducing a tax on the carbon 216 
content of goods and services – a ‘carbon tax’ (OECD, 2013). More generally, the idea is to 217 
coordinate the whole fiscal system in order to orient the monetary incentives of economic agents 218 
towards low-carbon investment and spending (Green Fiscal Commission, 2009; OECD, 2010). This 219 
includes not only implementing carbon taxes, but also phasing out subsidies to fossil fuels and 220 
introducing feed-in tariffs in support of renewable energy. The second way to establish a carbon 221 
price is to create a cap-and-trade system of emissions allowances (World Bank and Ecofys, 2013). In 222 
this case, the quantity of allowable emissions is fixed and the price is freely determined by the 223 
market. 224 
The implementation of a price on carbon should be able to correct the market failure related to the 225 
exclusion of environmental goods from the market pricing system, which makes it unattractive for 226 
the private sector to invest in green sectors. A comprehensive price system, capable of internalizing 227 
environmental externalities in economic decisions, should put households, firms and financial 228 
institutions in the position of wanting to participate to low-carbon sectors.  229 
However, two categories of complications affect this policy strategy. First, a carbon price may never 230 
be implemented. Proposals of carbon taxes or carbon markets are likely to encounter strong political 231 
and social resistance on the grounds that they will harm business and increase energy bills17. Even if 232 
these policies are introduced, they may not last for long, as the recent events in Australia clearly 233 
show18, or incur in major execution problems as it happened to European Union Emissions Trading 234 
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 A carbon price is usually defined as the price to be paid for the emission of 1 tonne of CO2 into the 
atmosphere.  
17
 See for instance the large media campaigns run in the United States by organizations as Americans for 
Prosperity and American Energy Alliance.  
18
 Australia introduced a carbon tax in July 2012. However, a new Prime Minister was elected in September 
2013 after an electoral campaign strongly centred on repealing the tax. The carbon tax was eventually 
repealed in July 2014 (see Financial Times, ‘Australia abolishes tax on carbon emissions’, July 17
th
, 2014). 
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Scheme19 (EU ETS). The uncertainty regarding the long-term policy commitment – which has been 235 
amplified by the recent reversal of public policies supporting renewable energy – is a major obstacle 236 
for green investment, as even in the presence of the ‘right’ prices firms may decide to wait to 237 
internalize them because they do not believe they will last. 238 
Second, this paper argues that even a stable and credible carbon price may not be sufficient to steer 239 
the required amount of economic resources to green investment. This is due to the existence of an 240 
additional market failure, related to the process of creation and allocation of credit, which may lead 241 
banks and other investors not to react as expected to price signals.  242 
This ‘credit market failure’ lies in the misalignment between the legitimate pursuit of private 243 
interests by commercial banks – which create the majority of the money supply - and the 244 
development objectives that a society sets to itself, the achievement of which is conditional to the 245 
availability of financial resources and a certain degree of monetary stability20. Banks’ ability to 246 
expand the existing money supply is in fact substantially autonomous. This is particularly true for 247 
high-income countries, where the desire to keep interest rates stable has led central banks to leave 248 
the dynamics of the money supply in the hands of the private banking system (see section 7). Public 249 
regulators, to the contrary of what postulated by the ‘money multiplier’ theory21, have therefore 250 
very limited control on the amount of credit that is being created, and how this is allocated 251 
throughout the economic system.  252 
As a consequence, the dynamics of money supply is likely to be sub-optimal from a social 253 
perspective. In particular, the ‘endogenous’ fluctuations of the financial system are much larger and 254 
more frequent than what would be optimal for a robust and sustained economic development. 255 
During phases of economic expansion, banks are willing to create a large amount of credit for the 256 
rest of the economy even – or especially - at a high degree of risk, because they are confident that 257 
loans are going to be repaid or that they will recoup with the underlying asset. A sort of ‘collective 258 
euphoria’ leads to the formation of excessive debt, which ultimately becomes unsustainable, 259 
triggering a financial crisis and a spiral of panic on the credit market (Minsky, 1992). Banks then stop 260 
lending to firms even in the presence of potential profitable investments, and become interested 261 
only in hyper-secure, highly liquid assets.  262 
The current historic period happens to provide a rather clear example of this situation. Banks are 263 
currently focusing on reducing their balance sheets and shifting away from risky activities rather 264 
than making credit available to the productive economy. This means that the supply of credit has 265 
been strongly constrained (BIS/NIESR, 2013; Feyen and Gonzalez del Mazo, 2013), as private banks 266 
are trying to achieve lighter balance sheets. Credit rationing, together with the weak demand for 267 
credit from the private sector, has led to substantially flat credit growth in recent years (BIS, 2013a), 268 
which in turn had disastrous consequences for the wider economic system and is still posing a 269 
significant obstacle to investment and economic recovery.  270 
The autonomy of the private banking system in determining credit dynamics can be appreciated by 271 
looking at the ineffectiveness of the policies put in place by major central banks in the attempt to 272 
revive credit creation. At first, they employed their ‘traditional’ monetary policies based on the 273 
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 The EU ETS has been afflicted by a range of implementation problems, the most relevant of which currently 
is the very low price of allowances. A proposal to strengthen the scheme has been rejected by the European 
Parliament in April 2013 (see The Economist, ‘ETS, RIP?’, April 20
th
, 2013). 
20
 The detachment between banks’ private interests and wider social objectives is so pronounced that some 
authors are arguing for the implementation of a 100% reserve ratio, which would transfer the power of money 
creation in the sole hands of central banks, leaving private banks with the ability to lend only in presence of 
backing deposits (Benes and Kumhof, 2012; Jackson and Dyson, 2013).  
21
 According to money multiplier theory central banks are capable of controlling the dynamics of the broad 
money supply by adjusting the amount of the monetary base (Mishkin, 2011). 
 8 
manipulation of the price of central bank reserves – the reference interest rates - lowering them to 274 
unprecedented low levels, very close to zero (BIS, 2013a). However, these price-based policies have 275 
been almost completely ineffective in reactivating lending and growth. Central banks then resorted 276 
to ‘unconventional’ monetary policies, focused on quantities rather than prices. These have taken 277 
the form of a ‘Quantitative Easing’ (QE), an expansion of central banks’ balance sheets through the 278 
creation of new reserves at the disposal of the private banking system – achieved through the 279 
simultaneous purchase of financial assets, typically government bonds, from the secondary market - 280 
in the hope that it would resume its lending to businesses22 (Fawley and Neely, 2013). 281 
The effect of the QE measures have been ambiguous (Bridges and Thomas, 2012; Ryan-Collins et al., 282 
2013). Figure 3 compares the recent dynamics of narrow and broad money for the Euro Zone, the 283 
United States and the United Kingdom. The effect of QE on the monetary base is evident, especially 284 
for the US and the UK: the amounts of central bank reserves rose steeply as a result of the Fed and 285 
Bank of England interventions on the markets. However, the dynamics of broad money in these 286 
countries remained substantially flat, indicating that the banking system did not respond as hoped to 287 
regulators’ policies and is, to the contrary of what textbook economic knowledge would imply, 288 
ultimately autonomous in its lending decisions23. 289 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE – File name: “Fig 3 – Quantitative easing”] 290 
[CAPTION: Monetary base and broad money in the Euro Zone (EZ), United States (US) and United 291 
Kingdom (UK). August 2008 = 100.24] 292 
At the moment, banks are just not willing to lend, whatever the price of central bank reserves is, and 293 
despite the presence of potential profitable investments. Two factors concur in generating this 294 
result. First, the dire economic situation contributes to deteriorate the risk/return profile of the 295 
majority of investments by increasing potential risks. Second, during slumps the risk aversion of 296 
banks increase, often beyond what would be ‘reasonable’. Economic agents – in the financial 297 
markets above all – tend in fact to exhibit irrational conducts and herd behaviour (Shiller, 2000), 298 
which may result in an overestimation of investment risks and an exceptionally high demand for 299 
ultra-secure assets like US government bonds. Under similar circumstances, a carbon price may not 300 
be sufficient to stimulate credit creation in favour of low-carbon activities. Or, to put it differently, 301 
the carbon price that would be required to overcome the endemic lack of confidence present on 302 
financial markets would be so substantial to be politically infeasible, or highly detrimental for the 303 
economic system25. 304 
                                                          
22
 Quantitative Easing measures were also aimed at achieving other objectives rather than just stimulate credit 
creation. For instance, the purchase of sovereign bonds has effectively helped in calming the markets, 
especially in the case of the Euro Zone. This is testified by the very low interest rates on sovereign debt titles in 
the US, the UK, Germany, and by the decrease of interest rates for other economies after the 2011 spikes. In 
the case of US, additional benefit was given by the fact that corporate mortgage-backed assets were also 
purchased by the Fed, thus getting rid of a vast amount of ‘toxic titles’. 
23
 This notion is usually referred to as the ‘endogenous money theory’, which argues that private banks decide 
how much credit to create - that is, how many loans to grant - independently of how many reserves they have. 
Only afterwards, they ask for reserves to the central bank, which, unless it wants to cause a credit crunch and a 
financial crisis, will satisfy any demand for reserves coming from the private banking system. The causation 
process is thus completely reversed with respect to the money multiplier theory. See Lavoie (2003), Benes and 
Kumhof (2012), Disyatat (2011), Kydland and Prescott (1990). 
24
 Monetary base is defined as: cash and reserves (UK); monetary base (US); base money (EZ). Broad money is 
defined as: M4 (UK); M2 (US); M3 (EZ). Sources: European Central Bank for the Euro Zone; Federal Reserve 
Economic Data (FRED) for the US; Bank of England for the UK. 
25
 Fay et al. (2013) develop a similar analysis, arguing that the potential inability to change prices and the 
potential ineffectiveness of price signals at triggering the desired change call for the implementation of ‘green 
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For all the reasons above, hedging the risk of non-implementation by creating a portfolio of policies 305 
with the same objective – that is, increase low-carbon investment - would represent the most 306 
prudent course of action, as some may be more easily implementable or effective than others 307 
(Rozenberg et al., 2014). Certainly, policies come at a cost: each policy must be designed, 308 
implemented, enforced, monitored and evaluated. However, putting all hopes on a single policy - 309 
carbon pricing – could result in massive costs in the unfortunate event that a carbon price is never 310 
implemented, or insufficiently so, and no back-up plan has been put in place. 311 
5. Macroprudential regulation and its repercussions on low-carbon investment 312 
Banking regulators have been recently trying to correct the credit market failure by reducing the 313 
autonomy of private banks in creating credit. This attempt has been motivated by the desire of 314 
avoiding a repetition of the 2007 financial crisis, which was triggered by an uncontrolled growth of 315 
bank credit. The set of policies under discussion has taken the name of ‘macroprudential regulation’ 316 
(Galati and Moessner 2011). 317 
The main effort in this direction has been the ‘Basel III’ Accord, which introduces stricter standards 318 
for banks on both the liquidity of their assets and the robustness of their capital (BIS, 2013a, b). In a 319 
nutshell, liquidity rules require banks to satisfy two conditions: 1. hold enough liquid assets – that is 320 
vault cash, central bank reserves and other highly liquid assets as sovereign bonds – to face a 321 
prolonged funding stress scenario (LCR – Liquidity Coverage Ratio); 2. match long-term assets – that 322 
is, with maturity over a year - with similarly long-term liabilities (NSFR – Net Stable Funding Ratio). 323 
The regulation regarding capital on the other hand introduces a range of ratios to be respected 324 
between the banks own capital and the stock of assets, which in some cases are adjusted according 325 
to their degree of risk (see Figure 2). The objective in this case is to prevent excessive leverage by the 326 
banking system, as their ability to create credit, if uncontrolled, can pose systemic risks to the 327 
functioning of economies. 328 
The new Basel III regulation is thought to be negatively affecting the already problematic access to 329 
finance of low-carbon sectors (Liebreich and McCrone, 2013; Spencer and Stevenson, 2013). For 330 
instance, imposing liquidity requirements would most likely produce a reallocation of investments 331 
towards liquid shorter-term assets, while low-carbon initiatives typically require long-term credit. In 332 
general, banks would tend to shy away from whatever they consider to be too risky, preferring to 333 
invest in very liquid standardized assets such as sovereign bonds rather than in projects 334 
characterized by a range of technological, financial and policy uncertainties as the low-carbon ones.  335 
The new rules concerning capital would also be likely to have a negative impact on green activities, 336 
as they would tend to reduce bank lending across all productive sectors, including the low-carbon 337 
ones. There are in fact only two strategies available to banks for which the capital requirement ratio 338 
is not respected: the first one is to increase their capital by issuing new shares or retaining profits; 339 
the second is to reduce the expansion of their balance sheet by constraining new credit creation or 340 
by selling their assets. For those capital ratios where assets are weighted according to their risk, 341 
banks can also improve their situation by reallocating their portfolios towards less risky assets, as 342 
they are already currently doing. None of these eventualities is likely to be beneficial for low-carbon 343 
sectors. 344 
However, it is unclear to what extent this flight to liquid low-risk short-term assets is taking place 345 
because of financial regulation, or just as a market-driven reaction of the banking system to the 346 
current economic situation. As a matter of fact, banks seem to be finding no particular problem in 347 
respecting the new rules (Cohen, 2013). However, even if Basel III was not currently acting as a 348 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
industrial policies’, which include a wider variety of policy instruments, both market-based and of the 
command-and-control type.  
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constraint on banking behaviour, it could do so in the future, once the deleveraging process 349 
terminates and private agents start to borrow and spend again. 350 
Hence, the crucial question becomes: can banking requirements act as a constraint on credit 351 
creation, either now or when the economy will be in the next expansion period? This is important 352 
because if requirements were indeed able to act as a constraint, then easing the constraints for 353 
specific destinations of lending – say, low-carbon productive activities - would give the banking 354 
system an incentive to create a proportionally larger amount of credit for the chosen sectors. 355 
6. Green macroprudential regulation 356 
The idea of easing public requirements for banks lending to low-carbon activities seems to have 357 
attracted some interest. Rozenberg et al (2013), for instance, argue for the introduction of 358 
differentiated reserve ratio requirements directed in favour of green sectors. Reserve ratio 359 
requirements relate the amount of reserves that banks possess - either in the form of cash kept in 360 
their vaults or as deposits held at the central bank – to the stock of their clients’ deposits (see Figure 361 
2). The reserve ratio is thus a form of liquidity requirement and gives an indication of how resilient a 362 
bank would be to an unexpected withdrawal of funds from its clients’ deposits. 363 
Differentiating reserve requirements means to impose different reserve requirements to different 364 
banks, depending on the destination sector of lending. In the case of green differentiated reserve 365 
requirements, the reserve ratio that banks have to satisfy would be lower than average for loans 366 
directed towards low-carbon sectors. Given that banks obtain their profits from lending, and that a 367 
lower reserve ratio expands the potential amount of credit that a bank can create, this policy should 368 
give an incentive to banks to direct a larger amount of lending towards green investment. 369 
In Rozenberg et al. (2013), the mechanism would work as follows (Figure 4). A firm is interested in 370 
investing in low-carbon activities - for instance, producing energy from wind. It presents the details 371 
of the project to an independent monitoring unit - e.g. an agency of the Ministry of Environment - 372 
that calculates the amount of polluting emissions that will be cut thanks to the project, and issues a 373 
corresponding amount of certificates. The firm then applies for a loan and, if the loan application is 374 
accepted, it hands the certificates to the bank. Finally, the bank can then use the certificates at the 375 
central bank as part of its reserve requirement. 376 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE – File name “Fig 4 – Green reserve requirements”] 377 
[CAPTION: Green differentiated reserve requirements in Rozenberg et al. (2013)] 378 
A similar scheme called ‘National Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Action’ (NEEREA) has 379 
been recently implemented in Lebanon (Banque du Liban, 2010; PWMSP, 2011).The scheme aims at 380 
providing cheap credit to the private sector for projects related to renewable energy production and 381 
energy efficiency in buildings. If the commercial bank decides to accept the loan request, the firm 382 
presents a technical study of the project, which is assessed by the Lebanese Center for Energy 383 
Conservation (LCEC), an agency affiliated to the Lebanese Ministry of Energy and Water. If the 384 
project is approved, the Lebanese Central Bank – Banque du Liban (BDL) - provides its support by 385 
reducing the bank’s obligatory reserve requirements by an amount equal to 100-150% of the loan. 386 
An analogous proposal involves setting differentiated capital requirements; that is, imposing 387 
different capital adequacy ratios according to the characteristics of the banking institute and the 388 
type of lending they provide. Capital requirements are likely to be more effective than liquidity ones 389 
in constraining bank lending, as even creating new central bank reserves would not change the 390 
capital ratio, or at least not in the way banks desire26. Therefore, implementing a regulatory 391 
                                                          
26
 In the case of central bank reserves being created simultaneously to a purchase of sovereign bonds from the 
banking system, there would be no expansion of the banking balance sheet, but just a change in the 
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framework where banks that lend to low-carbon (or other socially useful) sectors are required to 392 
respect looser requirements could fruitfully manage to direct larger flows of new credit creation 393 
towards them. A similar proposal involves calibrating the computation of Basel III risk-weighted 394 
capital ratios in a way that low-carbon activities would exert a lower pressure than alternative 395 
investments. 396 
An alternative strategy is the one employed by the Chinese Central Bank – People’s Bank of China 397 
(PBC). The PBC exerts a sort of soft pressure - called “window guidance” - on the banking system, for 398 
instance by holding monthly meetings with commercial banks to make sure that the allocation of 399 
credit across sectors follows the Central Bank’s strategic plans. The Chinese window guidance 400 
framework has focused extensively on low-carbon sectors, which are considered one of the most 401 
important priorities for the country’s development (Zadek and Chenghui, 2014). PBC (2013), for 402 
instance, states that “financial institutions were guided to intensify support (..) to sectors crucial for 403 
economic and social development such as (..) energy conservation and emissions reduction» and 404 
that «credit support to industries with high energy consumption and high emissions and industries 405 
with an overcapacity needs to be controlled.”. The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) 406 
also published a document presenting the ‘Green Credit Guidelines’, in which it is stated that 407 
”banking institutions shall promote green credit from a strategic height, increase the support to 408 
green, low-carbon and recycling economy, fend off environmental and social risks, and improve their 409 
own environmental and social performance.” (CBRC, 2012). 410 
7. Would green reserve requirements work? 411 
Among all the policies and policy proposals presented in the previous section, green differentiated 412 
reserve requirements seem to be the policy most seriously considered. However, would such a 413 
policy actually work? The answer depends on where the policy would be implemented. In many 414 
high-income countries, reserve ratios are in fact not likely to be effective as a constraint on bank 415 
lending behaviour, for at least two reasons. First, availability of reserves is currently far from being a 416 
problem for banks since central banks have inundated the interbank market with new liquidity 417 
through the Quantitative Easing policies presented in section 4. Additionally, and most importantly, 418 
in most modern banking systems, central bank reserves are not capable of acting as a constraint, 419 
even in non-extraordinary circumstances. This is due to the fact that in modern economies money 420 
does not have to be backed by any other asset. Central banks can potentially create reserves ad 421 
libitum, according to their objectives, simply by adding a new entry in their ledger accounts (Gray, 422 
2011). Thus, reserves can become a constraint on banks behaviour only if the central bank – or more 423 
precisely, the monetary policy framework that the central bank has put in place – allows and wants 424 
them to act as such. 425 
During the past decades, however, central banks in advanced economies have preferred to use as 426 
their main monetary policy instrument, the price of reserves – that is, the reference interest rate - 427 
rather than their quantity. The manipulation of the reference interest rate helps the central bank to 428 
have a better control on the interbank lending rate, which is the interest rate at which banks lend to 429 
one another. The two policies – a stable interbank interest rate and the use of reserves as a 430 
constraint – are incompatible with one other: if a central bank’s desire is to keep the price of money 431 
in the interbank market around a certain range – as the European Central Bank, the Fed, the Bank of 432 
England, the Bank of Japan and many others do - then they have to satisfy any demand of reserves 433 
coming from the banking market. Denying new reserves to banks in moments of liquidity stress 434 
would automatically put pressure on the price of reserves on the interbank market, putting the 435 
interest rate out of the control of the central bank. Therefore, in advanced economies, reserve 436 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
composition of its assets. In the case of bonds being purchased from other holders – say, institutional investors 
– then both the asset side (new reserves) and the liabilities side (new deposits of institutional investors) would 
expand by the same amount, thus deteriorating the capital ratio. 
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requirements can’t act as a constraint because central banks guarantee to satisfy any demand of 437 
reserves at the price they fix - the reference interest rate. 438 
Not all countries, however, adopt the same monetary policy framework. For instance, the People's 439 
Bank of China is strongly involved in the management of credit allocation and employs a wider range 440 
of monetary policy tools other than the interest rate, including reserve requirements and other 441 
quantitative instruments (Ma et al., 2013; Porter and Xu, 2009; Turner et al., 2012). The PBC is able 442 
to make reserves act as a constraint by accepting a higher volatility of the interbank market interest 443 
rate: in periods of liquidity shortage, instead of depending on the unlimited reserves creation by the 444 
central bank as in advanced economies, banks will borrow from the interbank market affecting the 445 
rate they apply to each other27. 446 
Both China and a number of other emerging economies have used reserve requirements as a 447 
monetary policy tool in recent years28 (Ma et al., 2013). This contrasts with advanced economies 448 
central banking practices, in which reserve requirements – made ineffective by the focus on the 449 
interest rate as sole monetary instrument – have been gradually reduced to very low levels, and in 450 
some cases abolished29. Emerging economies also provide a wide range of other examples of 451 
macroprudential quantitative policies aimed at mitigating systemic risk, giving central banks the 452 
capability of orientating credit creation towards the sectors considered as strategic for country 453 
development.30. A non-exhaustive list of policy tools include liquidity and capital requirements, caps 454 
on the loan-to-value ratio, caps on debt-to-income ratio, ceilings on credit growth, restrictions on 455 
profit distribution, and many others (Lim et al., 2011). 456 
The PBC is also using so-called “dynamic” differentiated reserve requirements (Ma et al., 2013; 457 
Morgan Stanley, 2011; PBC, 2013): the reserve ratio is not fixed at the same level for every 458 
institution but can differ according to their size, their financial conditions – for instance, their capital 459 
adequacy ratio – and the sector they operate in. Figure 5 shows how from 2008, a wedge has been 460 
introduced between the reserve ratio requirements for small and large banks. A similar approach 461 
could be used to steer the creation of credit towards low-carbon productive activities, as Rozenberg 462 
et al. (2013) propose. 463 
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE – File name: “Fig 5 – Chinese reserve ratios”] 464 
                                                          
27
 However, the freedom of the central bank to let the interbank rate fluctuate is not limitless, as the recent 
‘cash crunch’ illustrates. In June 2013, a range of circumstances created pressure on the Chinese interbank 
liquidity, causing the interbank interest rates to increase. The PBC initially decided not to intervene, refusing 
the injection of reserves that some banks needed to respect their reserve requirements. This behaviour was 
also apparently motivated by the desire to send a signal to domestic financial institutions, considered to have 
created an excessive and undesired amount of loans (hence the need for reserves). However, the dangerous 
spike in the interbank market interest rates, with the repo rate reaching 30%, eventually forced the PBC to 
provide the additional liquidity requested. A similar episode took place in December 2013. See The Economist, 
'What caused China's cash crunch?', July 4th 2013. 
28
 In some emerging economies, including China, the increase in reserve requirements has been mainly aimed 
at limiting the macroeconomic consequences of their foreign exchange stabilization policies: to avoid an 
undesired appreciation of their currency as a result of their strong trade balances, many central banks have 
started purchasing foreign currency at a fixed rate, so as to prevent their households and firms from 
exchanging it in the market and causing an appreciation of the domestic currency. The purchase of foreign 
exchange by central banks is financed by the creation of new reserves. In order to limit the amount of liquidity 
created, central banks then increase the required reserve ratios so to freeze the excess liquidity. See Duncan 
(2012). 
29
 Australia, New Zealand and United Kingdom are among the countries where no reserve ratio is applied 
(Gray, 2011). 
30
 Credit control is particularly frequent in Eastern Asia - China, Thailand, Singapore, Korea, Malaysia - and 
Eastern Europe - Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, Serbia (Lim et al. 2011). 
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[CAPTION: Reserve ratio requirements in China, 2001-2013 (Source: Ma et al. 2013; Bloomberg)] 465 
These policies may appear very far from the usual central banking practice in high-income countries. 466 
However, the vast majority of advanced economies have implemented some form of 467 
macroprudential policy at some point in the past. Elliott et al. (2013) review the long history of 468 
macroprudential instruments employed by the United States throughout the last century to promote 469 
or curb credit growth, often with specific sectors in mind (housing, for instance). These included 470 
underwriting standards, reserve requirements, deposit rate ceilings, credit growth limits, supervisory 471 
pressures and other policies, which have helped public authorities in their attempt of moulding the 472 
shape of the American economic system. The deregulation process during the ‘80s has been the 473 
main factor causing the gradual disappearance of these policies, which left the Federal Reserve with 474 
the manipulation of the interest rate as its sole monetary policy tool. A similar process was 475 
experienced by Japan, where the central bank conducted policies that resembled the current 476 
Chinese monetary framework until the deregulation and financial liberalization during the late ‘80s 477 
has made it impossible to continue (Fukumoto et al., 2010). 478 
Furthermore, in the wake of the recent financial crisis and recession, a number of central banks have 479 
started to experiment new ‘unconventional’ measures, which often go beyond their traditional 480 
mandates. For instance, the central banks of high-income regions - Fed, European Central Bank, 481 
Bank of England and Bank of Japan - all began a policy of ‘forward guidance’, through which they aim 482 
to influence market expectations by expressing commitments regarding the future dynamics of 483 
interest rates. Sometimes these expressed intentions are linked to the achievement of some policy 484 
objective – such as a certain unemployment rate31 – thus explicitly expanding central bank mandates 485 
beyond price stability to include wider macroeconomic considerations.   486 
8 Merits and limitations of public development banks  487 
The analysis in the previous sections focused on public policies aimed at inducing a large creation of 488 
credit by the private banking system towards the low-carbon sectors. However, public regulators 489 
also have the additional option to lend directly to the sectors they consider strategic. This can be 490 
achieved through public development banks, financial institutions devoted to supporting the process 491 
of national economic development32. 492 
National development banks include, to cite some of the largest, the China Development Bank 493 
(CDB), the German Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (KfW) and the Brazilian Banco Nacional do 494 
Desenvolvimento (BNDES). Development banks can also be incorporated in multilateral institutions 495 
such as European Investment Bank (EIB), the International Bank for Reconstruction and 496 
Development (IBRD) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Both multilateral and national 497 
development banks are able to provide credit to companies on terms more favourable than those of 498 
the market and lend to sectors that commercial banks are unwilling to finance. They also usually 499 
provide technical assistance to the projects and facilitate dialogue with political institutions. 500 
Public development banks can play an important role in delivering finance to the low-carbon 501 
economy, and many of them have already set up specific lending programs. In the 2007-12 period, at 502 
least $425bn have been provided by development banks to projects on renewable energy 503 
production, energy efficiency and other environmental-related activities (BNEF, 2013). In 2012, 504 
investments reached $109bn, growing 19% from the previous year and thus in contrast with the 505 
negative trend of green investments in the same period (see section 2). Among national 506 
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 For instance, in August 2013 the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England “agreed its intention 
not to raise Bank Rate from its current level of 0.5% at least until the Labour Force Survey (LFS) headline 
measure of the unemployment rate had fallen to a ‘threshold’ of 7%”.(Bank of England, 2013a). 
32
 For a detailed survey of national development banks, see de Luna-Martinez and Vicente (2012). 
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development banks, KfW has been by far the most active institution, followed by the China 507 
Development Bank. Multilateral development banks have also been the most active promoters of 508 
the diffusion of ‘green bonds’, which have strong potential for driving financial resources towards 509 
low-carbon sectors, especially if issued in large amounts and in a standardized fashion. The market is 510 
in a phase of rapid expansion, and the outstanding amount of green bonds is now valued at around 511 
$346 billion (CBI, 2013). 512 
An even more targeted experiment has been started in the United Kingdom through the creation of 513 
the Green Investment Bank (GIB), a development bank aimed at helping the country to meet its 514 
environmental targets by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, increasing the production of energy 515 
from renewable sources, improving energy efficiency and reducing waste (GIB, 2013). The GIB has 516 
been founded in 2012 with an initial allocation of £3bn by the government (now at £3.8bn), and has 517 
since shown a promising capacity of crowding in private investments33. 518 
The amount of finance made available from national and multilateral development banks is thus far 519 
from negligible. However, it must be noted that their range of action is strongly limited by the fact 520 
that public development banks lack one of the most crucial characteristics of banks: the ability to 521 
autonomously expand their own balance sheets. The power of creating credit through the act of 522 
lending is in fact forbidden to development banks, which have to limit their lending to the amount of 523 
finance they are able to raise on the secondary markets through the issuance of, for instance, green 524 
bonds. The case of the Green Investment Bank is even more problematic, as the bank not only lacks 525 
the power to create new credit ex nihilo, but also the ability to borrow from the markets. The UK 526 
Treasury has frozen this possibility until at least 2015-16 to avoid the further expansion of the 527 
country’s public debt. Consequently, the GIB will not be able to lend anything more than the 528 
endowment granted by the government, thus strongly limiting potential emission reductions. 529 
Overcoming these obstacles is going to prove very challenging. For instance, the Bank of England 530 
could purchase debt securities issued by the Green Investment Bank, which could then lend the 531 
funds to low-carbon activities - a sort of ‘green’ quantitative easing (Murphy and Hines, 2010). This 532 
would probably prove to be extremely controversial under the current macroeconomic setting, as it 533 
would be similar to public credit creation by the Central Bank. However, as unconventional this 534 
proposal may appear, it is not unprecedented. At the end of World War II, the Canadian Central 535 
Bank created an Industrial Development Bank (IDB) aimed at supporting the small and medium 536 
enterprise sector. The IDB – which in its 31 years of operations lent money to approximately fifty 537 
thousand businesses – was entirely financed by the Central Bank, which purchased the whole 538 
amount of bonds issued by the IDB through the creation of new reserves (Ryan-Collins et al., 2013). 539 
Despite their inability to leverage, which limits the effectiveness of their interventions, public 540 
development banks are likely to play a relevant role in the transition to a low-carbon society. Their 541 
developmental approach makes them the financial institutions most suitable to provide credit to 542 
sectors judged socially useful. Having development banks as more solid actors in the global credit 543 
system would help to increase the volume of resources to low-carbon sectors, expand the market 544 
for green bonds and act as a catalyst for the private sector investors. 545 
9. Conclusions and further research 546 
The climate change challenge will require a transition to a low-carbon economic system, 547 
characterized by the production of energy from renewable resources, high efficiency and a smart 548 
                                                          
33
 In their first 5 months of operations, the total amount of finance raised by GIB was approximately £2.3bn, of 
which 635 million was committed by the GIB itself, and the rest by private investors. The average mobilisation 
ratio was thus around 3:1 (GIB, 2013). 
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use of ecological resources. Investment in low-carbon sectors is, however, still far from what would 549 
be needed according to estimates, and investment in fossil fuel energy capacity still too high. 550 
One of the main obstacles to filling the investment gap is the market failure related to the exclusion 551 
of ecological and common goods from the market pricing system. Introducing a carbon price, either 552 
through the fiscal system or via the creation of a carbon market, is thus a necessary precondition to 553 
induce private investors to be interested in green sectors. 554 
However, a carbon price may not be enough. In order to carry out their activities, low-carbon firms 555 
necessitate credit. Under certain economic conditions, of which the post financial crisis period 556 
represents the most recent realization, banks may lack the confidence to create new credit even in 557 
the presence of right prices and profitable investments. This credit market failure, together with the 558 
deep uncertainties surrounding the future implementation of a carbon price, makes the case for 559 
considering a wider portfolio of policies. Examples include green differentiated reserve and capital 560 
requirements, modifying the risk weights for computing capital requirements in favour of low-561 
carbon assets and other quantitative macroprudential policies aimed at easing lending conditions for 562 
low-carbon firms. 563 
As unconventional as these policies may seem, they are far from unprecedented. Macroprudential 564 
regulation is currently implemented in a large number of emerging economies, and has been 565 
frequently employed in advanced economies in the past. However, the employment of these policies 566 
requires moving beyond current central banking practice in high-income countries, which in past 567 
decades have been using reference interest rates as their sole policy tool. Despite the wave of new 568 
financial regulation and the current reshaping of central bank mandates, adopting measures aimed 569 
at controlling credit allocation is going to prove challenging and controversial. 570 
For this reason, much work remains to be done on the research side. In particular, the discussion of 571 
how to finance the transition to a low-carbon society would benefit from being founded on a well-572 
developed and reliable set of economic theories. In particular, a stronger theoretical connection 573 
needs to be developed between two areas of research that have traditionally been separate: the 574 
economics of sustainability - the multidimensional analysis of how societies interact with their 575 
natural environment – and monetary and banking economics. The connection between these two 576 
spheres must be studied from both a policy and an economic theory perspective in order to reach a 577 
systemic understanding of how the transition – or the lack thereof - could affect the future dynamics 578 
of our economies. In particular, the role of banks and the wider financial system in facilitating the 579 
achievement of a sustainable economy constitutes a promising and relatively unexplored area of 580 
research that could shed light on the multiple layers of macroeconomic systems management. 581 
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